Being Realistic about Reasons pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2024

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T. M. Scanlon

Oxford University Press

2014-3-15

144

USD 29.95

Hardcover

9780199678488

图书标签: 哲学 ethics 伦理学 Philosophy 元伦理学 normative 实践基础 reason

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发表于2024-11-21

Being Realistic about Reasons epub 下载 mobi 下载 pdf 下载 txt 电子书下载 2024

Being Realistic about Reasons pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2024

图书描述

T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

Being Realistic about Reasons 下载 mobi epub pdf txt 电子书

著者简介

T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (CUP, 2003), and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008).

图书目录

Being Realistic about Reasons pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载

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用户评价

评分☆☆☆☆☆

如果说元伦理学是汪洋大海，那这份作品就是其中最高的浪尖之一。短短百多页探讨了元伦理学领域内几乎所有的重要问题，基于理由基础主义立场，并着重回击了建构主义（Korsgaard、O'Neil、Rawls）和基于欲望的主观主义（很多论证应该是从帕菲特那里得到了启发）；基于实在论立场回击了表达主义乃至规范表达主义（Gibbard））；承继卡尔纳普和奎因的相关学说提出领域多元论，和一种robust naturalistic realism（Enoch）拉开距离，并回应古怪性挑战和随附性挑战；借用罗尔斯的反思平衡模型为强认知主义奠基，同时为（部分的）道德多元论提供可能。唯一美中不足的就是对外在主义的回应太少（真正的回应其实只有一段），借Davidson的理论轻飘飘地打过了太极......

评分☆☆☆☆☆

一盘大棋，如何不用康德的方法谈实践理性和行动的规范性。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

一本非常可敬的小册子，斯坎伦在一系列metaethics问题跟其他大家（尤其Williams、Korsgaard、Harman）的对话不可不谓精彩——虽然我依旧不能赞同Scanlon的这种（reason） realism。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

一百来页构筑了一个完整一致的元伦理系统，回应了几乎所有该领域的主要问题。再仔细铺展一下主要论点就更好了，感觉写成五百页都不过。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

小册子，但既不简约也不简单，论证密度极大，没有大家小书常见的凝练晓畅感，因为不避枝蔓，在理由基础主义的形而上学疑难、实践重要性说明、认识论问题以及理由的强度和可选择性特征说明这一主线下对欲望理论、康德式建构主义、表达主义，威廉斯、考思佳、吉巴德等各路主张作了回应，也因此，不少子题分散在全书中，有时觉得挺乱。虽然立场鲜明，对其他理论路线也作了全面但简略的回应，但要说多透彻、多有说服力也不见得，不如说是对各种理论路线作了更精确的澄清，挑明了彼此分歧究竟在哪，在七个得分点（p. 3）上各自得失几何。而所谓realistic，似乎指自己的理由认知主义立场不强求某种追根究底、十足可靠的说明，很温和、很有界限感，贴近常识实实在在（p. 2，p.123）。