The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
经济运行的基本模型即市场机制,市场作为“看不见的手”,以价格为信号引导着人们追求自我利益最大化,而很多时候,也“无心插柳”地促进了社会的公共利益。但是,面对垄断、外部性、信息不完全和公共物品领域等,市场存在着失灵的现象,这时便需要引入政府管制对模型进...
評分 評分正如上贴所言,为何无人识,确实非常奇怪的,国内学者好像很少引用这本书,研究新制度经济学的,对这本书好像推荐不多?自己还是上西方财政学时,老师在讲公共品时,对这本书有初步的介绍。作者研究的是社区合作,而这不在政府与市场之内,也许这就是被经济学家们忽略的...
評分 評分正如上贴所言,为何无人识,确实非常奇怪的,国内学者好像很少引用这本书,研究新制度经济学的,对这本书好像推荐不多?自己还是上西方财政学时,老师在讲公共品时,对这本书有初步的介绍。作者研究的是社区合作,而这不在政府与市场之内,也许这就是被经济学家们忽略的...
CPR
评分作者實在是太considerate瞭,每一個道理都講得相當透徹,經常是我剛剛寫下心得就發現下一句正是我寫的心得的意思...
评分經典論著
评分製度設計
评分4星。當年轟動一時,而且讓作者得瞭諾貝爾經濟學奬。但是仔細想想有一些過譽。作者真正的貢獻在於提齣解決CPR問題不能隻靠國傢或者市場,因為二者(尤其是前者)可能會缺乏地方信息。但這一點實際上哈耶剋很早就講瞭(大約作者寫這書50年前),所以不是很清楚這本書真正的貢獻在什麼地方。作者提齣的8條解決CPR的建議都需要嚴格的論證和實證檢驗,而這些是這本書沒有提供的。作者的分析方法主要是比較案例,但是沒有迴答為什麼要關心這些案例?以90年代的標準看,這本書依然是上乘之作,但是放在今天,閱讀的收獲會比較小。最重要的是,為什麼自治組織不能産生特殊利益?這是我在美國最常見的一種問題,所以我覺得Olson還是更高一籌。
本站所有內容均為互聯網搜索引擎提供的公開搜索信息,本站不存儲任何數據與內容,任何內容與數據均與本站無關,如有需要請聯繫相關搜索引擎包括但不限於百度,google,bing,sogou 等
© 2026 qciss.net All Rights Reserved. 小哈圖書下載中心 版权所有