The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
中国的环境面临着从所未有的压力,空气、水和垃圾的问题是环保组织最关心的。就我的观察而言,目前环保组织的争取重点在政府信息的公开与民间组织的的介入,即在外部监督上做文章。 本身不是政治学的科班出身,出于工作的需要和个人的兴趣而阅读这本书,对埃莉诺的思想源流等...
评分奥斯特罗姆通过大量的事例,向我们介绍关于公共事务治理方法,并进行后续分析。由三个理论引出本书的内容分析,包括哈丁的“公地灾难”、“囚犯难题”及奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”。这些理论模型都说明,个人的理性行动最终导致的却是集体无理性的结果。 对此,以往认为的解...
评分经济学解决“公地悲剧”的第三条道路 经济学将自己的理论建立在“理性人”的基础上,也就是说个人的私利,通过市场这个“看不见的手”,能够导致公利的产生。从亚当·斯密到曼德维尔,然后经过20世纪的哈耶克和弗里德曼等人的完善,让自私成为了一种美德。 自由市场经济理论的...
评分经济运行的基本模型即市场机制,市场作为“看不见的手”,以价格为信号引导着人们追求自我利益最大化,而很多时候,也“无心插柳”地促进了社会的公共利益。但是,面对垄断、外部性、信息不完全和公共物品领域等,市场存在着失灵的现象,这时便需要引入政府管制对模型进...
评分第一次上导师的课,老师就讲了如何读书的问题,听后深感惋惜,要是早听四年的话,估计我的本科生涯不会那么混乱,当然这也与我的性格有关,不过总不至于那么混乱。老师说读书应该按照由近及远、由专到通、强调专业和兴趣,并要求书籍与文章兼顾,因为后来出现的书一般都会...
制度设计
评分因为经典,所以近于常识;语言平顺,逻辑清晰。
评分谭老师退休,想起来奥斯特罗姆夫妇,想起来我开政治学系还留存什么遗产,想起来我始终不是学政治科学的料,谭老师及之后Wilson所带给我的那些丝微的兴趣,也许只是斯德哥尔摩。
评分不分主次啰嗦至极!!!!
评分classic. 为了thesis读的书,相见恨晚获益匪浅。虽然理论的实践总是面对诸多困难,但至少提供了一种可探索的模式。个人对广泛适用的简单模型不是很感冒,因为通常模型越简单,现实越打脸,所以这种多方考量商量着来留出余地的讨论反而比较合我胃口。
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