具体描述
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
作者简介
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
目录信息
读后感
五年前在清华共管学院进修时曾听过奥斯特罗姆的讲座,但全程英文,且当时我并未看过她的经典著作《公共事物的治理之道》,奔赴她的讲座纯属对第一位获得诺贝尔经济学奖女性的好奇。学院的王亚华老师曾赴美在她手下学习过一段时间,在公管院那么长时间,我也只听过他一次讲座,...
奥斯特罗姆通过大量的事例,向我们介绍关于公共事务治理方法,并进行后续分析。由三个理论引出本书的内容分析,包括哈丁的“公地灾难”、“囚犯难题”及奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”。这些理论模型都说明,个人的理性行动最终导致的却是集体无理性的结果。 对此,以往认为的解...
正如上贴所言,为何无人识,确实非常奇怪的,国内学者好像很少引用这本书,研究新制度经济学的,对这本书好像推荐不多?自己还是上西方财政学时,老师在讲公共品时,对这本书有初步的介绍。作者研究的是社区合作,而这不在政府与市场之内,也许这就是被经济学家们忽略的...
正如上贴所言,为何无人识,确实非常奇怪的,国内学者好像很少引用这本书,研究新制度经济学的,对这本书好像推荐不多?自己还是上西方财政学时,老师在讲公共品时,对这本书有初步的介绍。作者研究的是社区合作,而这不在政府与市场之内,也许这就是被经济学家们忽略的...
用户评价
CPR
4星。当年轰动一时,而且让作者得了诺贝尔经济学奖。但是仔细想想有一些过誉。作者真正的贡献在于提出解决CPR问题不能只靠国家或者市场,因为二者(尤其是前者)可能会缺乏地方信息。但这一点实际上哈耶克很早就讲了(大约作者写这书50年前),所以不是很清楚这本书真正的贡献在什么地方。作者提出的8条解决CPR的建议都需要严格的论证和实证检验,而这些是这本书没有提供的。作者的分析方法主要是比较案例,但是没有回答为什么要关心这些案例?以90年代的标准看,这本书依然是上乘之作,但是放在今天,阅读的收获会比较小。最重要的是,为什么自治组织不能产生特殊利益?这是我在美国最常见的一种问题,所以我觉得Olson还是更高一筹。
因为经典,所以近于常识;语言平顺,逻辑清晰。
作者实在是太considerate了,每一个道理都讲得相当透彻,经常是我刚刚写下心得就发现下一句正是我写的心得的意思...
不分主次啰嗦至极!!!!