具体描述
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
作者简介
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
目录信息
读后感
本書的作者是公共經濟學與公共選擇學派的創始人之一,埃莉諾・奧斯特羅姆(Elinor Ostrom)。副標題叫做“集體行動制度的演進”.在我看來,其副標題,簡明扼要點出全書的核心。 開頭要說一說關於翻譯的事情,我不確定原書當中如何遣詞造句,但此書翻譯的水準讓我來說到底有...
首先承认这个标题确实有“姨学”的感觉,因为刘数卷阿姨经常把这句话挂在嘴边(无非就是指他们远邪党是中国未来的种子云云)。但是这句诗文本来就不是他的专利,他能用,我也能用。 这本书着实令我喜出望外------对山泽林薮这样的重要资源,到底是应该由国家进行管控还是应该由...
用户评价
作者实在是太considerate了,每一个道理都讲得相当透彻,经常是我刚刚写下心得就发现下一句正是我写的心得的意思...
"前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定,国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义,故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排,奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源,提出社区产权的第三条路。" 引自熊猫。只读了第一三六章的Chris
制度设计
因为经典,所以近于常识;语言平顺,逻辑清晰。
4星。当年轰动一时,而且让作者得了诺贝尔经济学奖。但是仔细想想有一些过誉。作者真正的贡献在于提出解决CPR问题不能只靠国家或者市场,因为二者(尤其是前者)可能会缺乏地方信息。但这一点实际上哈耶克很早就讲了(大约作者写这书50年前),所以不是很清楚这本书真正的贡献在什么地方。作者提出的8条解决CPR的建议都需要严格的论证和实证检验,而这些是这本书没有提供的。作者的分析方法主要是比较案例,但是没有回答为什么要关心这些案例?以90年代的标准看,这本书依然是上乘之作,但是放在今天,阅读的收获会比较小。最重要的是,为什么自治组织不能产生特殊利益?这是我在美国最常见的一种问题,所以我觉得Olson还是更高一筹。