What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
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當領導人和盟友的權力分布相對平衡時,盟友可以做齣有效懲罰(替換)領導人的可信威脅,從而阻止個人專權,維持權力分享。一旦領導人實力明顯強於盟友(依靠革命鬥爭時的聲望和功績,或憑藉信息優勢逐步竊取個人權力),盟友將無力阻止個人專權的齣現,權力分享走嚮破裂。 由於強大到足以消滅任何盟友,個人專權局麵幾乎不可能由內部打破,而隻能是外部入侵、民眾起義或領導人的自然死亡。
评分拋開形式模型不說,至少是超越瞭Geddes的,最科學完整的威權分類。
评分教授大人實際上有要求我這個勉強過瞭綜閤考的人,暑假還要加強修煉,每個星期都從她那邊弄本書迴去精讀...
评分現在再翻翻書中中國的部分,Svolik教授估計要大跌眼鏡瞭吧....
评分馬剋一些之前讀的書
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