What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
评分
评分
评分
评分
威权主义的讨论既繁,对知识的再结构化也就呼之欲出,Svolik这本书正好起到这样的作用,故而占据节点,广受征引。虽组织完备,但逻辑似嫌简单,未得深透。倒是更欣赏他划分民主/威权毫不妥协的二分法,有一点春秋笔意方能不落庸俗,显露精神。
评分Great analysis
评分内容鞭辟入里,发人深省,虽然看的不是很懂,但博弈论数学证明很厉害
评分抛开形式模型不说,至少是超越了Geddes的,最科学完整的威权分类。
评分抛开形式模型不说,至少是超越了Geddes的,最科学完整的威权分类。
本站所有内容均为互联网搜索引擎提供的公开搜索信息,本站不存储任何数据与内容,任何内容与数据均与本站无关,如有需要请联系相关搜索引擎包括但不限于百度,google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 qciss.net All Rights Reserved. 小哈图书下载中心 版权所有