What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
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当领导人和盟友的权力分布相对平衡时,盟友可以做出有效惩罚(替换)领导人的可信威胁,从而阻止个人专权,维持权力分享。一旦领导人实力明显强于盟友(依靠革命斗争时的声望和功绩,或凭借信息优势逐步窃取个人权力),盟友将无力阻止个人专权的出现,权力分享走向破裂。 由于强大到足以消灭任何盟友,个人专权局面几乎不可能由内部打破,而只能是外部入侵、民众起义或领导人的自然死亡。
评分教授大人实际上有要求我这个勉强过了综合考的人,暑假还要加强修炼,每个星期都从她那边弄本书回去精读...
评分马克一些之前读的书
评分其实是简单的土崩瓦解论!
评分Svolik值得期待必成大器
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