Constitutional law is clearly shaped by judicial actors. But who else contributes? Scholars in the past have recognized that the legislative branch plays a significant role in determining structural issues, such as separation of powers and federalism, but stopped there - claiming that only courts had the independence and expertise to safeguard individual and minority rights. In this readable and engaging narrative, the authors identify the nuts and bolts of the national dialogue and relate succinct examples of how elected officials and the general public often dominate the Supreme Court in defining the Constitution's meaning. Making use of case studies on race, privacy, federalism, war powers, speech, and religion, Devins and Fisher demonstrate how elected officials uphold individual rights in such areas as religious liberty and free speech as well as, and often better than, the courts. This fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy argues that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights.

尼爾•戴文思（Neal Devins），美國威廉瑪麗學院法學教授和政府學教授、權利法案研究中心主任，同時擔任杜剋大學齣版社“憲法衝突”書係的主編。

路易斯•費希爾（Louis Fisher），美國著名憲法學者，權力分立和憲法問題專傢，曾任國會研究機構高級研究員，並擔任眾議院“伊朗門”調查委員會研究主任（1987年），撰寫瞭最終報告的主要部分。