具体描述
Kant's discussion of the relations between cognition and self-consciousness lie at the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason , in the celebrated transcendental deduction. Although this section of Kant's masterpiece is widely believed to contain important insights into cognition and self-consciousness, it has long been viewed as unusually obscure. Many philosophers have tried to avoid the transcendental psychology that Kant employed. By contrast, Patricia Kitcher follows Kant's careful delineation of the necessary conditions for knowledge and his intricate argument that knowledge requires self-consciousness. She argues that far from being an exercise in armchair psychology, the thesis that thinkers must be aware of the connections among their mental states offers an astute analysis of the requirements of rational thought.
The book opens by situating Kant's theories in the then contemporary debates about 'apperception,' personal identity and the relations between object cognition and self-consciousness. After laying out Kant's argument that the distinctive kind of knowledge that humans have requires a unified self- consciousness, Kitcher considers the implications of his theory for current problems in the philosophy of mind. If Kant is right that rational cognition requires acts of thought that are at least implicitly conscious, then theories of consciousness face a second 'hard problem' beyond the familiar difficulties with the qualities of sensations. How is conscious reasoning to be understood? Kitcher shows that current accounts of the self-ascription of belief have great trouble in explaining the case where subjects know their reasons for the belief. She presents a 'new' Kantian approach to handling this problem. In this way, the book reveals Kant as a thinker of great relevance to contemporary philosophy, one whose allegedly obscure achievements provide solutions to problems that are still with us.
作者简介
Patricia Kitcher is Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University. She is the author of Kant's Transcendental Psychology
目录信息
1
. Overview, 3
1. Searching for Kant’s Thinker, 3
2. Interpretive Framework, 5
3. Preview, 7
4. Current Work on Kant’s ‘I-Think’, 10
Part I
: Background
2
. Locke’s Internal Sense and Kant’s Changing Views, 15
1. Locke’s Influence, 15
2. Locke’s Complex Theory of Internal Sense, 16
3. Kant’s Varied Reactions, 18
4. ‘Inner Sense’ in Relation to Kantian ‘Apperception’, 21
5. Kant’s Use of ‘Inner Sense’, 25
3
. Personal Identity and Its Problems, 27
1. Locke’s Problems, 27
2. Leibniz’s Criticisms and Additions, 28
3. Kant and Hume, 31
4. Tetens (and Hume), 32
4
. Rationalist Metaphysics of Mind, 39
1. The Role of Rationalism, 39
2. Leibniz’s Elegant I-theory, 40
3. Faculties, Powers and Substances, 43
4. Rational Psychology, 47
5
. Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and Cognition, 54
1. Introduction, 54
2. Locke’s ‘Reflection’ and Leibniz’s ‘Apperception’, 54
3. Self-consciousness and Object Cognition, 57
4. Self-consciousness through Self-Feeling, 62
5. Summary, 64
6
. Strands of Argument in the Duisburg NachlaU+03B2, 66
1. Introduction, 66
2. Kant’s Objection to the Inaugural Dissertation, 66
3. Principles of Appearance and Thought in the Duisburg NachlaU+03B2, 68
4. What is the Duisburg NachlaU+03B2’s Notion of ‘Apperception’?, 72
5. From the Duisburg NachlaU+03B2 to the Critique, 76
Part II
: Theory
7
. A Transcendental Deduction for A Priori Concepts, 81
1. Kant’s Goal, 81
2. Clues to the Nature of the Argument, 84
3. The First Premise of the Transcendental Deduction, 89
4. Apriority and Activity, 93
5. A ‘Transcendental’ Deduction, 95
8
. Synthesis: Why and How?, 98
1. Problems to Be Solved, 98
2. Kant’s Definition, 100
3. Synthesis and Objective Reference, 108
4. Five Syntheses and Their Relations, 114
9
. Arguing for Apperception, 115
1. Introduction, 115
2. ‘I-Think’ as the ‘Cogito’; The One-step Deduction from Judgment, 115
3. What Kind of Cognition Is at Issue in the Transcendental Deduction?, 118
4. What Is the Principle of Apperception?, 121
5. The Apperceptive Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept, 126
6. Combination and Self-consciousness in the B Deduction, 142
7. Arguing from the Unity of Apperception to the Necessary Applicability of Categories to Intuitions, 152
8. Transcendental Apperception, Empirical Apperception, and ‘Mineness’, 157
9. Summary, 159
10
. The Power of Apperception, 161
1. Introduction, 161
2. What is the Power/Faculty of Apperception?, 162
3. Does the Faculty of Apperception Endure? Is it the ‘Inner Principle’ of a Substance?, 164
4. Does the Power of Apperception Initiate Causal Chains or Provide Impressions of Necessary Connection?, 166
5. ‘Is It an Experience That I think?’, 173
6. Root Powers, Scientific Ideals, and the Ground of Appearances, 175
11
. ‘I-Think’ as the Destroyer of Rational Psychology, 180
1. Understanding Kant’s Criticisms, 180
2. Kant’s Earlier and Later Treatments of Rational Psychology, 182
3. ‘I-Think’ as the Vehicle of the Categories, 187
4. ‘I-Think’ as Analytically Contained in the Concept of Thought, 189
5. Does the Analysis of Cognition Imply the Existence of a Thinker?, 193
6. Why Can’t Thinkers Know Themselves as Such?, 197
Part III
: Evaluation
12
. Is Kant’s Theory Consistent?, 203
1. The Old Objection, 203
2. The Most Problematic Passage (A251–52), 205
3. Confusions about the Causes of Sensations, 206
4. A Second Look at the Most Problematic Passage, 210
5. Criticizing Rationalist Confusions, 213
6. What Kant’s Epistemology and Metaphysics Imply, 215
13
. The Normativity Objection, 217
1. Psychologism or Noumenalism?, 217
2. Scrutinizing Sensations and Adding ‘Transcendental Content’, 219
3. Forming Concepts and Acquiring the I-Representation, 223
4. Making A Priori Principles Explicit and Testing Instances, 227
5. Normativity and the I-Rule, 231
Appendix: Longuenesse on Concept Formation, 234
14
. Is Kant’s Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?, 238
1. Introduction, 238
2. Texts Linking Theoretical and Practical Reason, 241
3. Autonomy and Accountability, 245
4. Intellectual Accountability, 247
15
. Kant Our Contemporary, 249
1. Supporting and Showing Relevance, 249
2. Transcendental Arguments, 250
3. Must Rational Cognition involve Self-consciousness?, 253
4. A Second Hard Problem of Consciousness?, 265
5. Other ‘I’s, 268
Notes, 271
Bibliography, 293
Index, 301
· · · · · · (收起)
读后感
用户评价
这本书最令人称奇的一点，在于它对“界限”的不断试探与超越。作者似乎在不懈地追问“我们所知的极限在哪里？” 他以一种近乎手术刀般精准的分析能力，解剖了我们习以为常的许多认知框架。读完之后，我感觉自己看待日常世界的视角被彻底打乱并重构了。那些曾经坚不可摧的信念，现在都变得可以被审视和质疑。这种颠覆性的体验，让我既感到一丝迷茫，但更多的是一种被解放的兴奋。作者没有给我们提供一个现成的、舒适的结论，而是将我们置于一个充满可能性的真空地带，鼓励我们自己去构建意义。这种开放性极强的处理方式，使得这本书拥有了惊人的持久生命力，每次重读都会有新的感悟浮现。
这本书真是让人大开眼界，它毫不费力地将那些晦涩难懂的哲学概念转化为引人入胜的故事。作者的叙事功力简直是大师级的，他构建了一个宏大而又细腻的世界观，让我仿佛亲身置于那些思想交锋的中心。我尤其欣赏他对人性的深刻洞察，笔下的人物不再是抽象的符号，而是有血有肉、充满矛盾的个体。阅读的过程中，我常常停下来，反复咀嚼那些精妙的比喻和犀利的论断。那种醍醐灌顶的感觉，久久不能平复。这本书的结构设计也十分巧妙，如同一个精密的钟表，每一个齿轮都在为整体的完美运转贡献力量，节奏张弛有度，引人入胜，让人根本舍不得放下。它不仅仅是知识的传递，更像是一次精神的洗礼，让我对周遭的一切，包括我自身的存在，都有了全新的理解和审视。
我必须承认，这本书的“重量感”是压倒性的。它不是一本可以随便放在床头消遣的书，它更像是摆在书房中央、需要一本正经地对待的经典。作者的行文风格带着一种无可争议的权威感，他的论证链条几乎找不到可以突破的漏洞。虽然有时会因为涉及大量抽象的逻辑推演而感到思维的疲惫，但只要坚持下去，就能体会到其内在的宏伟蓝图。它在某种程度上，重塑了我对“严肃写作”的定义。它教导我们，真正的深刻，往往是需要付出努力才能抵达的。这本书的价值，不在于它提供了多少现成的观点，而在于它培养了一种审视一切、深度探究事物的思维习惯，这对于任何一个严肃的思考者来说，都是一份无价的财富。
说实话，这本书的阅读体验像是在攀登一座技术难度极高的山峰。它不是那种能让你轻松滑翔而过的入门读物，它要求读者拿出真正的学术热情和批判精神。我发现自己不得不频繁地查阅背景资料，甚至需要时不时地翻回前几章去重新梳理作者建立的概念体系。这种“挑战性”恰恰是它最吸引我的地方。它拒绝提供简单的答案，而是耐心地引导你走向更复杂、更具反思性的问题。每一次攻克一个难懂的段落，都伴随着巨大的成就感，这种知识上的满足感是其他很多畅销书无法比拟的。它更像是一份邀请函，邀请那些真正渴望深度思考的人加入一场永无止境的智力探险。如果你只是想找点轻松的读物，那这本书可能不太适合你；但如果你准备好迎接一场智力上的“搏斗”，那么它绝对是无上的珍馐。
我得说，这本书的语言风格实在是太独特了，充满了古典的韵味却又不失现代的敏锐。那些长句的构建，看似复杂，实则逻辑严密，如同精雕细琢的巴洛克式建筑，层层叠叠，却又和谐统一。初读时，确实需要一些耐心去适应这种略显“沉重”的文风，但一旦进入作者设定的节奏，那种沉浸式的体验是无与伦比的。它迫使你放慢速度，去真正品味每一个词语背后的重量和意图。更难能可贵的是，作者在探讨宏大命题的同时，没有忘记个体的情感波动，那些夹杂在严谨论证中的哲思片段，如同深海中的微光，瞬间点亮了整个黑暗的文本。我能感受到作者在字里行间倾注的巨大心血和对真理近乎偏执的追求，这使得整本书散发出一种庄重而又令人敬畏的气场。
xjbx
尽管Wolfgang Carl指名这本。。然而心理主义的解释倾向还是太重了。
尽管Wolfgang Carl指名这本。。然而心理主义的解释倾向还是太重了。
xjbx
尽管Wolfgang Carl指名这本。。然而心理主义的解释倾向还是太重了。
