When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume reflects major recent developments in thinking about this 'factive turn', and advances the lively debate around it in relation to core epistemological themes including perception, evidence, justification, knowledge, scepticism, rationality, and action. With clear and comprehensive chapters written by leading figures in the field, this book will be essential for students and scholars looking to engage with the state of the art in epistemology.

I am Associate Professor and Head of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg, and a co-founder of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. I am also the South African team leader for The Geography of Philosophy Project.

I obtained my PhD from Cambridge in 2007, and my BA, Hons, and MA from Rhodes University. Before joining UJ I taught and researched at Universitaet Wien, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, and Rhodes University.

Last year, CUP published my book on the nature of evidence - Believable Evidence. I argue for ‘truthy psychologism’, the view that the evidence consists of true beliefs. I defend this view from metaethics, epistemology, and metaepistemology.

At the moment I am thinking about how the vocabulary of reasons can help us better theorise epistemic injustice, as part of a British Academy Newton Advanced Fellowship project 'Epistemic Injustice, Reasons, and Agency'.

homepage: http://velimitova.weebly.com/