具体描述
Index
作者简介
目录信息
1. The Need for a New Solution Concept
2. Games in Standard Form 29
3. Consequences of Desirable Properties 67
4. The Tracing Procedure 131
5. The Solution Concept 195
6. A Bargaining Problem with Transaction Costs on One Side 243
7. Trade Involving One Seller and More than One Seller 273
8. Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information on One Side 285
9. Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides 311
10. Postscript 341
Notes 365
Bibliography 369
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读后感
用户评价
诺贝尔奖得主写得就是好!
崇高的目标,但是方法复杂非常难领会精髓。一些主要的新concept贡献: standard form game, tracing procedure, risk dominance, etc. 作为两位诺奖大牛的著作却影响有限,不禁让人怀疑其论点是不是有些问题。佐证之一是HARSANYI之后1995在GEB的论文A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Complete Information对本书内容提出诸多改进。建议读者配合那篇文章一起批判性地读这本书。
诺贝尔奖得主写得就是好!
崇高的目标,但是方法复杂非常难领会精髓。一些主要的新concept贡献: standard form game, tracing procedure, risk dominance, etc. 作为两位诺奖大牛的著作却影响有限,不禁让人怀疑其论点是不是有些问题。佐证之一是HARSANYI之后1995在GEB的论文A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Complete Information对本书内容提出诸多改进。建议读者配合那篇文章一起批判性地读这本书。
诺贝尔奖得主写得就是好!