圖書標籤: 心靈哲學 哲學 Searle 貝剋萊 認識論 知覺哲學 洛剋 意識科學
发表于2024-11-05
Seeing Things as They Are pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024
his book provides a comprehensive account of the intentionality of perceptual experience. With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience. The central question concerns the relation between the subjective conscious perceptual field and the objective perceptual field. Everything in the objective field is either perceived or can be perceived. Nothing in the subjective field is perceived nor can be perceived precisely because the events in the subjective field consist of the perceivings , whether veridical or not, of the events in the objective field.
Searle begins by criticizing the classical theories of perception and identifies a single fallacy, what he calls the Bad Argument, as the source of nearly all of the confusions in the history of the philosophy of perception. He next justifies the claim that perceptual experiences have presentational intentionality and shows how this justifies the direct realism of his account. In the central theoretical chapters, he shows how it is possible that the raw phenomenology must necessarily determine certain form of intentionality. Searle introduces, in detail, the distinction between different levels of perception from the basic level to the higher levels and shows the internal relation between the features of the experience and the states of affairs presented by the experience. The account applies not just to language possessing human beings but to infants and conscious animals. He also discusses how the account relates to certain traditional puzzles about spectrum inversion, color and size constancy and the brain-in-the-vat thought experiments. In the final chapters he explains and refutes Disjunctivist theories of perception, explains the role of unconscious perception, and concludes by discussing traditional problems of perception such as skepticism.
John R. Searle is Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. His previous publications include Making the Social World (2010) and Mind: A Brief introduction (2004), both from Oxford University Press.
把對物理世界的解釋交給哲學傢們是不可靠的「校友也不行
評分塞爾已經完全失去瞭哲學分析的能力。他不是默認瞭許多可能有爭議的前提,而是完全拒絕考慮這些前提可能是有爭議的,甚至是故意忽略瞭可能會造成睏難的理論情形,這等於喪失瞭處理問題的意誌,以至於屢次直言自己不願意對某些細節進行解釋,另一些細節又“尚不明瞭”(那為什麼還要齣版呢?)。從這個角度來看,如今的塞爾有點像後期的羅素,但不同的是羅素放棄瞭《知識理論》,而塞爾則自鳴得意地在書中把“大哲學傢”踩在腳底,並給自己的狗取名為“塔斯基”。至於哲學史梳理的部分,更是隻能當成笑話來看:對貝剋萊和洛剋毫不掩飾衊視之情,對現象主義和再現主義的瞭解卻又超不齣本科水平,更不要說他自己對視覺和距離的分析甚至還不如貝剋萊。還有顯擺的那點文化修養,連“通常認為格雷考的畫作是受到視覺障礙的影響”這種話都說得齣口……
評分除瞭disjunctivism一章,其它章節內容都是Searle以前所齣版書中觀點的綜述。塞爾作為能在哲學史上得到專節介紹的當代哲學傢,在社會學的意義上來看,對哲學的貢獻遠遠大於他的大部分同行。同時他用日常語言講哲學,踐行著某種基於常識和當代科學的自然主義,也是對充斥在人文學科行業內的神棍們的一次次祛魅。
評分塞爾已經完全失去瞭哲學分析的能力。他不是默認瞭許多可能有爭議的前提,而是完全拒絕考慮這些前提可能是有爭議的,甚至是故意忽略瞭可能會造成睏難的理論情形,這等於喪失瞭處理問題的意誌,以至於屢次直言自己不願意對某些細節進行解釋,另一些細節又“尚不明瞭”(那為什麼還要齣版呢?)。從這個角度來看,如今的塞爾有點像後期的羅素,但不同的是羅素放棄瞭《知識理論》,而塞爾則自鳴得意地在書中把“大哲學傢”踩在腳底,並給自己的狗取名為“塔斯基”。至於哲學史梳理的部分,更是隻能當成笑話來看:對貝剋萊和洛剋毫不掩飾衊視之情,對現象主義和再現主義的瞭解卻又超不齣本科水平,更不要說他自己對視覺和距離的分析甚至還不如貝剋萊。還有顯擺的那點文化修養,連“通常認為格雷考的畫作是受到視覺障礙的影響”這種話都說得齣口……
評分脫瞭2年終於還是看完瞭,由淺入深,但是深不到哪兒去,老爺子的巔峰時期還是一去不復返瞭
感觉和视觉要分开来做,脑科学和进化生物学都是这个主张的,基本ABC不累述。 还是说说孔子吧,禮樂崩坏也有年头了,中华哲学对Vision Cognition曾经有非常华丽的定义。 也就是【樂兿】六部: 1)雲門·坤為地=表象(Appearance); 2)大咸·山風蠱=現實(Reality)。 3)大韶...
評分感觉和视觉要分开来做,脑科学和进化生物学都是这个主张的,基本ABC不累述。 还是说说孔子吧,禮樂崩坏也有年头了,中华哲学对Vision Cognition曾经有非常华丽的定义。 也就是【樂兿】六部: 1)雲門·坤為地=表象(Appearance); 2)大咸·山風蠱=現實(Reality)。 3)大韶...
評分感觉和视觉要分开来做,脑科学和进化生物学都是这个主张的,基本ABC不累述。 还是说说孔子吧,禮樂崩坏也有年头了,中华哲学对Vision Cognition曾经有非常华丽的定义。 也就是【樂兿】六部: 1)雲門·坤為地=表象(Appearance); 2)大咸·山風蠱=現實(Reality)。 3)大韶...
評分感觉和视觉要分开来做,脑科学和进化生物学都是这个主张的,基本ABC不累述。 还是说说孔子吧,禮樂崩坏也有年头了,中华哲学对Vision Cognition曾经有非常华丽的定义。 也就是【樂兿】六部: 1)雲門·坤為地=表象(Appearance); 2)大咸·山風蠱=現實(Reality)。 3)大韶...
評分感觉和视觉要分开来做,脑科学和进化生物学都是这个主张的,基本ABC不累述。 还是说说孔子吧,禮樂崩坏也有年头了,中华哲学对Vision Cognition曾经有非常华丽的定义。 也就是【樂兿】六部: 1)雲門·坤為地=表象(Appearance); 2)大咸·山風蠱=現實(Reality)。 3)大韶...
Seeing Things as They Are pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024