Does it matter when politicians ignore the promises they made and the preferences of their constituents? If politicians want to be reelected or see their party reelected at the end of their term, why would they impose unpopular policies? Susan Stokes explores these questions by developing a model of policy switches and then testing it with statistical and qualitative data from Latin American elections over the past two decades. She concludes that politicians may change policies because unpopular policies are best for constituents and hence also will best serve their own political ambitions.
评分
评分
评分
评分
最近经常看Stokes,还是学theory的写作水平高
评分最近经常看Stokes,还是学theory的写作水平高
评分最近经常看Stokes,还是学theory的写作水平高
评分最近经常看Stokes,还是学theory的写作水平高
评分最近经常看Stokes,还是学theory的写作水平高
本站所有内容均为互联网搜索引擎提供的公开搜索信息,本站不存储任何数据与内容,任何内容与数据均与本站无关,如有需要请联系相关搜索引擎包括但不限于百度,google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 qciss.net All Rights Reserved. 小哈图书下载中心 版权所有