Perception & its Objects pdf epub mobi txt 電子書下載 2024

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Bill Brewer

Oxford University Press, USA

2011-5-8

208

USD 45.00

Hardcover

9780199260256

圖書標籤: 貝剋萊認識論知覺哲學洛剋懷疑論大衛·劉易斯塞拉斯哲學

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发表于2024-11-04

Perception & its Objects epub 下載 mobi 下載 pdf 下載 txt 電子書下載 2024

Perception & its Objects pdf epub mobi txt 電子書下載 2024

圖書描述

Bill Brewer presents, motivates, and defends a bold new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should we best understand the most fundamental nature of our perceptual relation with the physical objects in the world around us? Most theorists today analyse perception in terms of its representational content, in large part in order to avoid fatal problems attending the early modern conception of perception as a relation with particular mind-dependent objects of experience. Having set up the underlying problem and explored the lessons to be learnt from the various difficulties faced by opposing early modern responses to it, Bill Brewer argues that this contemporary approach has serious problems of its own. Furthermore, the early modern insight that perception is most fundamentally to be construed as a relation of conscious acquaintance with certain direct objects of experience is, he claims, perfectly consistent with the commonsense identification of such direct objects with persisting mind-independent physical objects themselves. Brewer here provides a critical, historical account of the philosophy of perception, in order to present a defensible vindication of empirical realism.

Perception & its Objects 下載 mobi epub pdf txt 電子書

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Perception & its Objects pdf epub mobi txt 電子書下載

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一切都很好，但是一到立論就很迷惑。錯覺論證的主要邏輯是：1.視覺的直接對象O是與外在對象不同的F；2.F依賴於心靈；3.所以O依賴於心靈。而作者試圖建立直接現實主義（否認3），策略是把1和2改為“O在視覺中相似於F的範本”。他設想，O相似於但不“是”F，而F以範本介入，就能避免3。然而，他將視覺下的相似定義為“具有多數相同的光學過程”。這裏，他似乎以為隻要將視覺還原為物理環境和過程就能免除其對心靈的依賴，但事實上隻有對於處在這一過程中的心靈來說O纔可能相似於F。這個策略還有個更直觀的後果：我們必須把“看起來，O是F”翻譯為“看起來，O相似於F”，但這根本不符閤知覺現象本身，因為現象是視覺上的同一而非相似。其他的問題也有，但最搞的可能是作者反駁另一種策略的某些論證似乎也能用在自己的策略上…

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