Perception & its Objects pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2024

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Bill Brewer

Oxford University Press, USA

2011-5-8

208

USD 45.00

Hardcover

9780199260256

图书标签: 贝克莱认识论知觉哲学洛克怀疑论大卫·刘易斯塞拉斯哲学

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发表于2024-11-22

Perception & its Objects epub 下载 mobi 下载 pdf 下载 txt 电子书下载 2024

Perception & its Objects pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2024

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Bill Brewer presents, motivates, and defends a bold new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should we best understand the most fundamental nature of our perceptual relation with the physical objects in the world around us? Most theorists today analyse perception in terms of its representational content, in large part in order to avoid fatal problems attending the early modern conception of perception as a relation with particular mind-dependent objects of experience. Having set up the underlying problem and explored the lessons to be learnt from the various difficulties faced by opposing early modern responses to it, Bill Brewer argues that this contemporary approach has serious problems of its own. Furthermore, the early modern insight that perception is most fundamentally to be construed as a relation of conscious acquaintance with certain direct objects of experience is, he claims, perfectly consistent with the commonsense identification of such direct objects with persisting mind-independent physical objects themselves. Brewer here provides a critical, historical account of the philosophy of perception, in order to present a defensible vindication of empirical realism.

Perception & its Objects 下载 mobi epub pdf txt 电子书

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一切都很好，但是一到立论就很迷惑。错觉论证的主要逻辑是：1.视觉的直接对象O是与外在对象不同的F；2.F依赖于心灵；3.所以O依赖于心灵。而作者试图建立直接现实主义（否认3），策略是把1和2改为“O在视觉中相似于F的范本”。他设想，O相似于但不“是”F，而F以范本介入，就能避免3。然而，他将视觉下的相似定义为“具有多数相同的光学过程”。这里，他似乎以为只要将视觉还原为物理环境和过程就能免除其对心灵的依赖，但事实上只有对于处在这一过程中的心灵来说O才可能相似于F。这个策略还有个更直观的后果：我们必须把“看起来，O是F”翻译为“看起来，O相似于F”，但这根本不符合知觉现象本身，因为现象是视觉上的同一而非相似。其他的问题也有，但最搞的可能是作者反驳另一种策略的某些论证似乎也能用在自己的策略上…

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