Preface xi
Introduction: What is Analytic Philosophy? 1
Leading Analytic Philosophers 6
1 Russell and Moore 8
Empiricism, Mathematics, and Symbolic Logic 8
Logicism 12
Russell on Definite Descriptions 20
G. E. Moore's Philosophy of Common Sense 27
Moore and Russell on Sense Data 30
Moore's and Russell's Anti-Hegelianism 33
Summary 38
2 Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Logical Positivism 46
Introduction 46
Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 48
Historical Note: The Vienna Circle and their Allies 58
The Elimination of Metaphysics and the Logical Positivist Program 59
The Demise of the Vienna Circle 68
The Influence of the Logical Positivists 69
3 Responses to Logical Positivism: Quine, Kuhn, and American Pragmatism 76
Introduction 76
The Demise of the Verifiability Criterion of Meaningfulness 78
Quine’s Rejection of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 82
Quinean Empiricism without the Dogmas 86
American Pragmatists after Quine: Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam 101
4 Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy and Later Wittgenstein 119
Introduction 119
The Attack on Formalism – Strawson and Ryle 124
Philosophy of Language – Austin and Wittgenstein 128
Philosophy of Mind – Ryle, Strawson, and Wittgenstein 138
The Rejection of Sense Data Theory 147
The Legacy of Ordinary Language Philosophy 153
5 Responses to Ordinary Language Philosophy: Logic, Language, and Mind 160
Part 1: Formal Logic and Philosophy of Language 161
G¨odel and Tarski 161
Davidson 166
Grice 174
Carnap – Meaning and Necessity 178
Chomsky 180
Part 2: Philosophy of Mind 183
Functionalism 183
Objections to Functionalism – Bats and the Chinese Room 188
Anomalous Monism 192
The Problem of Mental Causation 194
6 The Rebirth of Metaphysics 204
Modal Logic 204
Possible Worlds 212
Problems with the Canonical Conception of Possible Worlds 216
Transworld Identity and Identification 223
The Modal Version of the Ontological Argument 229
7 Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds: Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan 239
Introduction 239
The Traditional Theory of Meaning and Reference 240
Kripke's and Donnellan's Criticism of the Traditional Theory: Names and Descriptions 243
Natural Kind Terms 247
Problems for the New Theory of Reference 253
Applications of the New Theory of Reference to the Philosophy of Mind 257
The Social, Cultural, and Institutional Basis of Meaning and Reference 260
8 Ethics and Metaethics in the Analytic Tradition 264
Introduction 264
G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica 266
The Non-Cognitivism of C. L. Stevenson 269
The Universal Prescriptivism of R. M. Hare 272
The Return to Substantive Ethics 275
Questioning the Fact/Value Divide 278
Peter Singer and Animal Liberation 281
John Rawls' Theory of Justice 285
9 Epilogue: Analytic Philosophy Today and Tomorrow 299
Analytic Philosophy since 1980 299
What is the Future of Analytic Philosophy? 321
References 327
Index 337
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