圖書標籤: 經濟學  政治學  政治  PoliticalEconomy  BryanCaplan  民主  文學  劉瑜推薦   

喜歡 The Myth of the Rational Voter 的讀者還喜歡

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Proved systematic biases rather than aggregated wisdom for the more clear cut economic decisions of a democracy. Genuinely disentangled rationality from correlations with other decision factors by confining political attitudes to economic opinions.

Proved systematic biases rather than aggregated wisdom for the more clear cut economic decisions of a democracy. Genuinely disentangled rationality from correlations with other decision factors by confining political attitudes to economic opinions.

Proved systematic biases rather than aggregated wisdom for the more clear cut economic decisions of a democracy. Genuinely disentangled rationality from correlations with other decision factors by confining political attitudes to economic opinions.

Proved systematic biases rather than aggregated wisdom for the more clear cut economic decisions of a democracy. Genuinely disentangled rationality from correlations with other decision factors by confining political attitudes to economic opinions.

Proved systematic biases rather than aggregated wisdom for the more clear cut economic decisions of a democracy. Genuinely disentangled rationality from correlations with other decision factors by confining political attitudes to economic opinions.

美式民主的反对者常常以为资本主义制度下的选民都是自私的，他们从个人利益出发投票从而会伤害国家的整体利益；而政客们则说一套做一套，竞选的时候空许诺，最后出台的政策必然背离民意。这两个批评都是错的。 事实上，大量的研究表明，选民在投票的时候是非常无私的。大多数选...  

理性的选民是一个神话，作者开篇如是说到。 传统的经济学假定理性经济人，并把这种假定延伸到政治领域，假定选民在选择公共政策时也是理性的。但公共选择领域的新派经济学家告诉我们，选民存在着理性的无知(因为每张选票的边际价值几乎为0)并且选民有着自己的观念偏好，或者称...