The Panic of 1819 was America's first great economic crisis. And this is Rothbard's masterful account, the first full scholarly book on the topic and still the most definitive. It was his dissertation, published in 1962 but nearly impossible to get until this new edition, the first with the high production values associated with Mises Institute publications.
The American Economic Review was wild for this book when it appeared: "Rothbard's work represents the only published, book-length, academic treatise on the remedies that were proposed, debated, and enacted in attempts to cope with the crisis of 1819," the reviewer wrote. "As such, the book should certainly find a place on the shelf of the study of U.S. business cycles and of the economic historian who is interested in the early economic development of the United States."
And specialists have treasured the book for years. It is incredible to realized that some American historians think of MN Rothbard as the author of this book and nothing else!
Rothbard tells the story about a disaster that could not be attributed to some specific government blunder or disaster. It seemed to originate from within the economic system itself. Its cause was not obvious to observers at the time. Confronted with something new, the Panic engendered much discussion and debate about possible causes and remedies. As Rothbard observes, the panic provides "an instructive picture of a people coming to grips with the problems of a business depression, problems which, in modified forms, were to plague Americans until the present day."
The Panic of 1819 grew largely out of the changes wrought by the War of 1812, and by the postwar boom that followed. The war also brought a rash of paper money, as the government borrowed heavily to finance the war. The government depended on note-issuing banks spread throughout the country. All of this put tremendous strains on the banks’ reserves of specie held against such notes. This would inevitably lead to suspension of specie payments in some parts of the country in 1814.
Freed from the shackles of hard money, the suspension of specie led to a boom in the number of new banks started in the country, and a subsequent boom in note issuance. The war altered the economic pattern of production in a way very different from what would have evolved in the absence of war, and thus it placed the economy on a sandy foundation, vulnerable to distress when the war ended. Indeed, it was in this boom phase that the New York Stock Exchange was founded in 1817: born in a bubble.
So, when peace did come, the revival of foreign trade began to reverse some of the trends started during the war. Swelling imports led to falling commodity prices. "The influx of imports spelled trouble for war-grown manufacturers, especially textiles, which suddenly had to face the onrush of foreign competition," Rothbard notes.
For the modern reader, this paints an all-too-familiar scene: the plight of the domestic manufacturer--one that continues to bedevil steel, lumber, and others today. As with all economic phenomena, however, there is crisis for some and opportunity for others. Exporters, for example, would thrive.
There were many cranky and contradictory remedies proposed, and Rothbard reviews each one. But in the end, there was no widespread confusion on what caused the downturn. Instead, it was widely known that a false prosperity is a very dangerous thing. It always turns to bust. Bad legislation failed to pass, the government embarked on no New Deal planning, and there was no great reflation. And precisely because there was no intervention, the panic ended quickly and peacefully.
What we have here, then, is not only a dazzling historical account—the research here is deep and thorough and the prose a model of exposition—it also points the way to how all economic downturns can and should be handled. For that reason, the Panic of 1819 offers important lessons for us today. 282 page hardbound book with index and footnotes at the bottom of each page.
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本书的结构安排堪称教科书级别的典范,它不仅清晰地勾勒出了危机的爆发路径,更重要的是,它对不同政治派系如何利用或试图遏制这场危机进行了细致入微的对比分析。我尤其关注其中关于国家银行(Second Bank of the United States)角色的论述,作者并未采取非黑即白的简化立场,而是细致地呈现了中央银行在维护稳定与行使权力边界之间的微妙拉扯。地方州政府的反应尤其值得玩味,那种基于本州利益优先的“小气鬼式”财政政策,如何加剧了整体的碎片化和恢复的迟缓,这一点在今天看来,依然有着极强的现实警示意义。阅读过程中,我不断地在想,如果将这些历史案例置于现代的政治经济背景下重新审视,那些关于联邦干预程度的争论,本质上从未真正远离我们的视野。这种跨越时空的对话感,是本书最宝贵的价值之一。
评分这本书的深度在于其对“反应”(Reactions)的强调,它不满足于描述发生了什么,更着力于探究“为什么是那样发生”。作者对于公共舆论的转向进行了非常细致的追踪,从最初对银行的依赖,到危机爆发后排山倒海而来的指责与仇恨,这种公众情绪的剧烈摆动,清晰地勾勒出美国民主社会在面对经济冲击时的内在张力。我尤其欣赏作者对不同社会阶层之间利益冲突的呈现,这不是一场简单的富人与穷人之间的对抗,而是在信贷链条断裂后,不同债权人、债务人之间更为复杂的博弈,比如佃农、小店主、以及区域性银行之间的相互倾轧。这种多维度的冲突分析,打破了以往将经济危机简单归咎于一两个外部因素的刻板印象,展示了一幅充满内在矛盾的社会图景,让人不得不承认,历史的复杂性远超任何单一的理论模型。
评分从文笔上讲,作者的叙事功力令人赞叹。他避免了学究式的冗长和晦涩,用一种近乎于散文诗般的笔触,描绘了美国早期资本主义萌芽期的粗粝与野蛮生长。那些关于西部投机热潮的描写,充满了十九世纪初期美国人那种特有的、近乎鲁莽的扩张主义精神,那种相信土地就是财富的简单信仰,最终被金融工具的复杂性无情击碎。我特别欣赏作者在描述政策制定者心态时的克制与洞察力,他们大多是受过良好教育的精英,却在史无前例的经济冲击面前显得措手不及,那份试图用旧有工具解决新问题的徒劳感,跃然纸上。全书的节奏把握得极好,在历史背景的铺垫、危机的爆发、以及后续的缓慢复苏之间,张弛有度,让读者在理解复杂性的同时,也保持了阅读的愉悦感,绝非那种读起来令人昏昏欲睡的纯粹学术论著。
评分这部著作的视角转换着实引人入胜,它没有仅仅停留在对那场经济灾难的宏观叙述上,而是深入到那个时代人们的日常决策与集体心理的微观层面。我特别欣赏作者对于“恐慌”一词的解构,它远不止于市场信心的崩塌,更像是一种社会性的集体歇斯底里,那种从银行家到农场主的普遍焦虑,如同看不见的瘟疫般在邦联的各个角落蔓延。作者巧妙地利用了大量的私人信件和地方报纸的社论,将那些冰冷的经济数据赋予了人性的温度。读到那些关于土地抵押、债务追讨的细节时,我仿佛能听到十八世纪二十年代初期的美国小镇上,马蹄声带来的不安,以及家庭餐桌上沉重的沉默。这种对社会心理层面的挖掘,使得原本枯燥的金融史变得如同悬疑小说般扣人心弦,它揭示了在不确定性面前,人类理性是如何脆弱地被本能所取代的。那种对信贷扩张盲目乐观后突然而至的幻灭感,至今读来仍能让人感到一丝寒意。
评分坦白说,这本书的宏大叙事之下,隐藏着极其扎实的文献基础,但作者处理这些资料的方式非常高明,使得读者几乎感觉不到“学术搬运”的痕迹。它成功地将一个在今天看来略显遥远的金融事件,转化成了一个关于制度设计与社会韧性的永恒探讨。读完之后,我最大的感触是关于“预期管理”的重要性,危机中政府和商业领袖传递的信息,往往比实际的经济数据更能决定民众的行为模式。作者通过对不同州法律和货币政策的对比研究,揭示了在没有统一监管框架下,市场行为的非理性如何被放大,以及州级政府的碎片化应对策略如何成为拖延整体复苏的制度性障碍。这本书无疑为理解美国早期经济史提供了一个极其重要的新参照点,它不仅讲述了一个金融故事,更讲述了在国家塑造的关键时刻,政治、社会和经济力量是如何相互纠缠、共同塑造命运的。
评分经济学,唉,能不能不一来就给数据,真的很无聊。
评分经济学,唉,能不能不一来就给数据,真的很无聊。
评分经济学,唉,能不能不一来就给数据,真的很无聊。
评分经济学,唉,能不能不一来就给数据,真的很无聊。
评分经济学,唉,能不能不一来就给数据,真的很无聊。
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