Dictators and their Secret Police pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2024

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Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Cambridge University Press

2016-7-20

288

USD 34.99

Paperback

9781316505311

图书标签: 政治学比较政治威权主义比较威权历史 politics 秘密警察社会运动

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发表于2024-12-22

Dictators and their Secret Police epub 下载 mobi 下载 pdf 下载 txt 电子书下载 2024

Dictators and their Secret Police pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载 2024

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How do dictators stay in power? When, and how, do they use repression to do so? Dictators and their Secret Police explores the role of the coercive apparatus under authoritarian rule in Asia - how these secret organizations originated, how they operated, and how their violence affected ordinary citizens. Greitens argues that autocrats face a coercive dilemma: whether to create internal security forces designed to manage popular mobilization, or defend against potential coup. Violence against civilians, she suggests, is a byproduct of their attempt to resolve this dilemma. Drawing on a wealth of new historical evidence, this book challenges conventional wisdom on dictatorship: what autocrats are threatened by, how they respond, and how this affects the lives and security of the millions under their rule. It offers an unprecedented view into the use of surveillance, coercion, and violence, and sheds new light on the institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power.

Dictators and their Secret Police 下载 mobi epub pdf txt 电子书

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Dictators and their Secret Police pdf epub mobi txt 电子书下载

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威权领导人所面临的威胁情境（政变与民变）决定了统治者将会设计什么样的强制机构，而不同形式的机构也会带来不同的国家暴力模式。要之，如果统治者更担心政变，则会采用内部分化fragmentation从而外化exclusivity于社会的强制机构，这样能制约强制机构的力量从而避免政变，但是这种结构却让其不具有较强的intelligence能力，很难进行有目的性的镇压而偏向高烈度的全面暴力镇压。而担心民变的统治者，则会设计一种更单一且内化于社会的机构，更倾向于采用surveillance的方式，有特定的目标去限制暴力的使用。

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马克。独裁者根据精英和民众威胁大小和priority不同来设计相应的coercive apparatus，若前者威胁大则采用fragmented的coercive apparatus，后者则采用更inclusive和unified的coercive apparatus。解释突尼斯和台湾的case的那两张有趣。

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威权政权建构国家强制机器的起源