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发表于2024-11-07
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.
A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
"Tilman Borgers offers the first book-length introduction into the theory of mechanism design. Written in a very personal and masterful style, he carefully covers the main developments in theory of mechanism design-the theory of how to choose the rules of the game-over the past decades. It will be an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses for many years to come."
Dirk Bergemann, Douglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Chair, Yale University
"Tilman Borgers gives a beautifully lucid and elegant development of mechanism design in this wonderful book. His masterful exposition provides a unified and cohesive treatment of modern mechanism design, starting from first principles and working through topics at the leading edge of the research frontier. This book is a delight and an invaluable resource for those new to the field and experts alike."
Chris Shannon, Richard and Lisa Steiny Professor of Economics and Professor of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley
"This book provides an integrated treatment of the theory of mechanism design by a leading practitioner in this area. It covers the core theory together with chapters on recent developments in robust mechanism design and dynamic mechanism design. The core theory is built up in an original and pedagogically successful way, starting with screening in chapter 2 and immediately using those tools to develop leading applications of Bayesian mechanism design-auctions, bilateral trade, and public goods-in chapter 3. These results can then naturally be adapted to dominant strategies in chapter 4. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 then deal with the general theories of incentive compatibility, Bayesian mechanism design, and dominant strategy mechanism design.
The first seven chapters of the book focus on the quasi-linear environments studied in most economic applications, with more general environments ('non-transferable utility') postponed to chapter 8. This ordering of material reflects not the historical development of the subject but a natural and effective path to learn the material. Borgers develops a unified treatment of core material without attempting to be exhaustive. Valuable endnotes at the end of each chapter then explain the historical context and relation to the literature more broadly. It will serve as an excellent textbook for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, and an invaluable reference for researchers."
Stephen Morris, Professor of Economics, Princeton University
Tilman Börgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan. Before coming to Michigan in 2005, he was Professor of Economics at University College London. He holds a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics.
Daniel Krähmer is Full Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at Universität Bonn, Germany.
Roland Strausz is Full Professor and Chair of the Institute for Economic Theory at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Germany.
很好的mechanism design入門。從最簡單的例子逐漸抽象成最general的setting,最後抵達robust和dynamic的前沿。 事實上mechanism design是最能體現現代經濟學理論的做法的領域之一:基於博弈論(多人互動)框架,建立在analysis和topology之上的建模方式。
評分A very reasonable introductory textbook to mechanism design: (fairly) interesting and (almost) self-contained. Unfortunately, many mistakes remain in this manuscript and hopefully they would (if not have already) soon been spotted and corrected. Examples are very straightforward and build intuition. More problems will help too.
評分入門mechanism design最好的書籍
評分很好的mechanism design入門。從最簡單的例子逐漸抽象成最general的setting,最後抵達robust和dynamic的前沿。 事實上mechanism design是最能體現現代經濟學理論的做法的領域之一:基於博弈論(多人互動)框架,建立在analysis和topology之上的建模方式。
評分博一機製設計參考書,也算從入門到前沿吧,廢話也有,用更凝煉的數學來寫估計可以把篇幅縮短到幾十頁。
2007年还在读研究生一年级的时候,有一天晚上同学跟我说:田国强的老师得奖了。之后的几天陆陆续续知道Leo Hurwicz,Eric Maskin和Roger Myerson因为对机制设计的贡献而一起获得了诺奖。作为一名刚入学的硕士,我对于什么是机制设计还毫无概念可言。在这一点上我相信当时很多人...
評分2007年还在读研究生一年级的时候,有一天晚上同学跟我说:田国强的老师得奖了。之后的几天陆陆续续知道Leo Hurwicz,Eric Maskin和Roger Myerson因为对机制设计的贡献而一起获得了诺奖。作为一名刚入学的硕士,我对于什么是机制设计还毫无概念可言。在这一点上我相信当时很多人...
評分2007年还在读研究生一年级的时候,有一天晚上同学跟我说:田国强的老师得奖了。之后的几天陆陆续续知道Leo Hurwicz,Eric Maskin和Roger Myerson因为对机制设计的贡献而一起获得了诺奖。作为一名刚入学的硕士,我对于什么是机制设计还毫无概念可言。在这一点上我相信当时很多人...
評分2007年还在读研究生一年级的时候,有一天晚上同学跟我说:田国强的老师得奖了。之后的几天陆陆续续知道Leo Hurwicz,Eric Maskin和Roger Myerson因为对机制设计的贡献而一起获得了诺奖。作为一名刚入学的硕士,我对于什么是机制设计还毫无概念可言。在这一点上我相信当时很多人...
評分2007年还在读研究生一年级的时候,有一天晚上同学跟我说:田国强的老师得奖了。之后的几天陆陆续续知道Leo Hurwicz,Eric Maskin和Roger Myerson因为对机制设计的贡献而一起获得了诺奖。作为一名刚入学的硕士,我对于什么是机制设计还毫无概念可言。在这一点上我相信当时很多人...
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024