The authors argue that the rules and practices of corporate law mimic contractual provisions that parties involved in corporate enterprise would reach if they bargained about every contingency at zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. But bargaining and enforcement are costly, and corporate law provides the rules and an enforcement mechanism that govern relations among those who commit their capital to such ventures. The authors work out the reasons for supposing that this is the exclusive function of corporate law and the implications of this perspective.
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Every idea in this book is predicated on a somewhat oversimplified assumption: the market is the best solution to all corporate governance problems. It may well be the case for many issues, but I don’t think it can be consistently applied in every case. The book will be more persuasive if the arguments are less sweeping.
评分Every idea in this book is predicated on a somewhat oversimplified assumption: the market is the best solution to all corporate governance problems. It may well be the case for many issues, but I don’t think it can be consistently applied in every case. The book will be more persuasive if the arguments are less sweeping.
评分第五章有关Buying Out 以及majority vote，和如何维持party cohesion很类似。可以参考。
评分第五章有关Buying Out 以及majority vote，和如何维持party cohesion很类似。可以参考。
评分第五章有关Buying Out 以及majority vote，和如何维持party cohesion很类似。可以参考。
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