The Logic of Collective Action pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
- 经济学
- 政治学
- 社会学
- 集体行动
- economics
- 社会理论
- 奥尔森
- MancurOlson
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
具体描述
读后感
本书主要的观点可以概括为小集团可以为共同的集体利益提供低于最有供给水平的集体物品且提供这种物品所应分担的责任存在“以小欺大”的现象；但是大集团由于存在搭便车等问题很难为集体物品（目标）采取一致的行动。但是如果在具体的某类大集团中采取强制、选择性激励就可能...
评分 评分1.最近又翻看了一下这本书，买了10几年，书都发黄了。 2.原理仍然没问题，但时代多了互联网，结论可能会有较大变化。 3.行动成本与收益的测量是奥尔森理论的基础。 4.由于互联网的出现，行动成本，尤其是行动的串联成本大大降低，因此，在这个意义上，大集团的行动性质向小集团...
评分 评分用户评价
集体利益和个人理性的权衡理论，结合我国农村集体化生产历史可以得到更深刻体会。
评分奥尔森是个天才，博论做成这个样子，语言清晰简明逻辑清楚直白，实在厉害。读罢前两章的感觉，就是好像在理论内部的挑错完全进行不了了——他总是用长注堵住人的嘴：我都想到了哇！可是仔细想想，他的理论在这学期课程讨论的抗争政治意义上的集体行动中确实不太适用，大概有以下几个原因:第一，抗争政治群体的边界是更流动的，很难确定某一特定时间节点的总体规模，这样大小群体的区分不是被否定就是被弱化了；第二，抗争政治的结果是高度不确定的，和公共品的提供不同，没有人能真正计算出potential benefit来——即使可以，也高度不精确；最后，group size的乘数效应在抗争政治中更加明显：抗争多了一个人本身就带来大量的显性和隐性收益，小团体的抗争除非组织强大、目标明确、对象好找，否则失败的几率更高。
评分翻来覆去就是说个很简单的道理。难得在说的非常好！
评分这本写得真挺好看的。果然喜欢case呢
评分对于此书褒扬和运用已经甚多，无须赘述。反而有另外几点值得提出。一是，运用此书经常是批评大政府、阶级政治等理念的无效，因为个人不肯贡献力量取得公共品，但其实更好的运用可能是“逆用”或针对其问题的思考，即如何针对理性个人维护私利的特性，设计出有效的激励或威慑体制动员个人投身组织；二是，奥尔森把组织的公共品和选择性激励/私人收益截然分开，似乎值得商榷，这两者或许在有重合的时候能鼓励个人行动（如诺斯所言），选择性激励也可以是所得公共品的优先分配—所以这里公共利益在组织行动前后的性质会发生嬗变？三是，奥尔森的理论已经指明了交易成本（他称为谈判成本）在组织中的重要作用，比新制度经济学诸君早；最后，不同于许多时人，书中清楚表示理性人和经济理论运用有其局限，此书无法涵盖许多社会政治宗教方面集体行动。
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