具體描述
Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions. Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires. In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful. Reasons from Within will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons, particularly students of philosophy, psychology, and decision theory.
作者簡介
目錄資訊
I. Deliberation 1
II. Internalism versus Externalism 9
III. Advantages of Internalism: A Modified Humeanism 20
2. Reasons and Rationality 29
I. Reasons Defined 29
II. Rationality: The Information Requirement 45
III. Rationality: The Coherence Requirement 57
3. Emotions, Desires, and Reasons 83
I. Emotions and Desires 83
II. Desires, Depression, and Rationality 98
III. Desires and Reasons 108
4. The Externalist’s Examples 121
I. Learning Reasons for Desires 121
II. Prudence 132
III. Moral Motivation 143
IV. A Different Approach and a Last Ditch Reply 174
5. The Case Against Objective Value 186
I. Objective Value and Motivation 186
II. The Impartial and Impersonal Perspectives 202
III. Pleasures and Pains 222
IV. Good and Meaningful Lives 234
6. Conclusion 256
Index 263
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