David Arbel, is a former senior Israeli intelligence officer. Ran Edelist is a journalist and author.
In the second half of 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. It was an event of major historic and global dimensions, yet this strategic transformation of international relations took the entire world totally by suprise - despite the fact that the West saw in the Communist power an ideological foe and a major military threat. During the 1980s Western intelligence services spent about USD40 billion every year, most of it to monitor the Soviet Union and its satellites. Yet all of them, without exception, were taken by surprise when the red empire crumbled. The American CIA, Britain's MI-6, Germany's BND and the French DGSE all failed to comprehend that the Soviet Union was approaching the end of its imperial existence. A handful of honest intelligence professionals who identified the signs of weakness and distress were shunted aside. The authors of this book interviewed dozens of people who dealt with Soviet affairs in the 1980s, most of them in the United States, some in Europe, the Soviet Union and Israel. The interviewees included high ranking government officials, academics and journalists, but mostly intelligence personnel. All admitted having been caught off guard, but differed over the reasons for their surprise, and who was responsible for it.
“每一个受访者都毫不犹豫地承认苏联崩溃让他们吃了一惊,只是每个人对于这种毫无察觉给出的缘由却都互有不同。”这一点也让我很吃惊,一个重大的历史事件,也许往往并不能依靠分析研究,预测出准确形态。作者认为,当历史处于转折点时,运转的情报收集机制再复杂精巧,洞察转...
评分西方人对苏联研究的失败之处,在于他们没有预测能力,但他们受意识形态驱使而排斥对世界上这个地区做较为精确的社会科学分析,而这种分析可能包括“良好动机的成分,包括理性主义、利他主义、人的创造性,以及与“构造上的”宿命论和一概非法相反的不理智。真正的失败之处,在...
评分书中围绕西方情报机构对苏联解体的未预见性和在冷战时期西方与苏联,以美国中央情报局为代表的西方与苏联的情报机构克格勃的较量为引线。详细分析了当时美国、英国、苏联情报机构的开展,核武器对其机构的影响。以及英国盲从的相信美国的情报,导致了对苏联局势的误判。对当时...
评分这本书用大量事例说明,即便是受过优良教育,信息足够的西方领导人,在情报机构送来的客观事实面前,往往也只相信自己愿意相信的,或者自己的直观感受;情报机构的领导人往往也是这么对自己下属的。这种心态又直接反作用于情报机构里的下属给领导送的报告,以及情报给政治家送...
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