圖書標籤: 倫理學 政治哲學 平等與不平等 哲學
发表于2024-11-26
One Another's Equals pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024
An enduring theme of Western philosophy is that we are all one another’s equals. Yet the principle of basic equality is woefully under-explored in modern moral and political philosophy. In a major new work, Jeremy Waldron attempts to remedy that shortfall with a subtle and multifaceted account of the basis for the West’s commitment to human equality.
What does it mean to say we are all one another’s equals? Is this supposed to distinguish humans from other animals? What is human equality based on? Is it a religious idea, or a matter of human rights? Is there some essential feature that all human beings have in common? Waldron argues that there is no single characteristic that serves as the basis of equality. He says the case for moral equality rests on four capacities that all humans have the potential to possess in some degree: reason, autonomy, moral agency, and ability to love. But how should we regard the differences that people display on these various dimensions? And what are we to say about those who suffer from profound disability—people whose claim to humanity seems to outstrip any particular capacities they have along these lines?
Waldron, who has worked on the nature of equality for many years, confronts these questions and others fully and unflinchingly. Based on the Gifford Lectures he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 2015, One Another’s Equals takes Waldron’s thinking further and deeper than ever before.
Jeremy Waldron is University Professor in the School of Law at New York University.
全書無力處理的核心矛盾是事實與規範之間的關係究竟是什麼,這就使得W在提問時陷入如下誤區:將規範性命題的理由視為“經驗事實”,拒絕瞭形而上學論證而將康德係(羅爾斯、阿倫特)哲學人類學主體預設理解為幅度屬性。而且深層平等的基礎究竟是什麼,作者語焉不詳。限於講稿成書,論證綫索太過於散漫,問題推進比較混雜。試圖從德沃金齣發以不同於德沃金的方法論證其尊嚴的兩個原則,可惜完敗。
評分本書嘗試迴應的問題是:我們在公共或私人事務中常常具備一些關於人人平等的道德直覺或考量判斷,但我們多將其視為給定而很少就其基礎展開更深層次的探討,是否可能從人類的一些自身條件或特性齣發,使'基本平等'可被理解?作者認為一係列’域特性'(例如理性思考能力,道德能動性,愛的能力)的獲得潛能及其脆弱性是我們理解'基本平等'的關鍵(注意作者不是說這些特性應然地決定瞭基本平等的原則)。但不很清楚的是:該原則究竟適用於具備所有域特性潛能的個體抑或其中單一特性就足夠?如果基本平等的核心意涵是每個個體的利益都應予以平等考量,沒說清楚域特性(單個或全部)是如何支撐這規範性要求。從宗教齣發的基本平等是世俗理解的平行敘事抑或在迴應比世俗理解更深層次的問題?W師一貫的深入淺齣,就平等議題言是很不錯的入門書
評分本書嘗試迴應的問題是:我們在公共或私人事務中常常具備一些關於人人平等的道德直覺或考量判斷,但我們多將其視為給定而很少就其基礎展開更深層次的探討,是否可能從人類的一些自身條件或特性齣發,使'基本平等'可被理解?作者認為一係列’域特性'(例如理性思考能力,道德能動性,愛的能力)的獲得潛能及其脆弱性是我們理解'基本平等'的關鍵(注意作者不是說這些特性應然地決定瞭基本平等的原則)。但不很清楚的是:該原則究竟適用於具備所有域特性潛能的個體抑或其中單一特性就足夠?如果基本平等的核心意涵是每個個體的利益都應予以平等考量,沒說清楚域特性(單個或全部)是如何支撐這規範性要求。從宗教齣發的基本平等是世俗理解的平行敘事抑或在迴應比世俗理解更深層次的問題?W師一貫的深入淺齣,就平等議題言是很不錯的入門書
評分核心的兩三講組織得很混亂,首先規範性如何supervene on range porperties沒講明白,其次如何確定這些平等的porperties而非其他的同樣明顯的porperties似乎是專斷的,這就使得basic equality給齣的似乎非論證的答案。
評分全書無力處理的核心矛盾是事實與規範之間的關係究竟是什麼,這就使得W在提問時陷入如下誤區:將規範性命題的理由視為“經驗事實”,拒絕瞭形而上學論證而將康德係(羅爾斯、阿倫特)哲學人類學主體預設理解為幅度屬性。而且深層平等的基礎究竟是什麼,作者語焉不詳。限於講稿成書,論證綫索太過於散漫,問題推進比較混雜。試圖從德沃金齣發以不同於德沃金的方法論證其尊嚴的兩個原則,可惜完敗。
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One Another's Equals pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024