This book examines the nature of inquiry -- the general method by which we expand our knowledge. It proposes a resolution of the paradox of inquiry, originally formulated in Plato's Meno and most recently the focus of the "logic of discovery" debate in the philosophy of science. The logic of correction developed in the book directly opposes the claim made by evolutionary epistemologists such as Popper and Campbell that there is no such thing as a "logical method for having new ideas". The author argues that beyond scientific discovery, the same logic is uncovered in the more intimate form of inquiry we conduct as we attempt to articulate meanings for ourselves. This comprehensive and revolutionary theory challenges traditional epistemology's conception of justification and provides substantial new perspectives on such diverse topics as ampliative inference, representation and meaning, Platonic and Hegelian dialectic, Kantian analysis, the heuristic function of models and metaphors, and the role of inquiry in the constitution of human consciousness.Part I develops a logic of scientific discovery, arguing that new hypotheses are generated by editing or correcting antecedent hypotheses in response to empirical discrepancies. Part II outlines a theory of representation (focusing on the analog-digital distinction) that can serve as a bridge to a more general theory of inquiry. Part III uses the model of inquiry developed in Part I to interpret the process by which we come to articulate meanings for ourselves. And Part IV suggests that much of what we take to be human consciousness consists in the inquiry implicit in the "dialogue of the soul with itself".