具体描述
In this brief book one of the most distinguished living American philosophers takes up the question of whether ethical judgements can properly be considered objective - a question that has vexed philosophers over the past century. Looking at the efforts of philosophers from the Enlightenment through the twentieth century, Hilary Putnam traces the ways in which ethical problems arise in an historical context. Putnam's central concern is ontology - indeed, the very idea of ontology as the division of philosophy concerned with what (ultimately) exists. Reviewing what he deems the disastrous consequences of ontology's influence on analytic philosophy - in particular, the contortions it imposes upon debates about the objective of ethical judgements - Putnam proposes abandoning the very idea of ontology. He argues persuasively that the attempt to provide an ontological explanation of the objectivity of either mathematics or ethics is, in fact, an attempt to provide justifications that are extraneous to mathematics and ethics - and is thus deeply misguided.
作者简介
希拉里·普特南（Hilary Putnam），1926— ，当代美国著名哲学家、逻辑学家。新实用主义的主要代表人物，近三十年来英美哲学界最具影响力的哲学家之一，在哲学界享有极高的声誉。其研究兴趣广泛，在心灵哲学，语言哲学、科学哲学、逻辑学等诸多领域均有重大影响，被誉为“当代惟一具有‘综观全局’能力的哲学家”。普特南曾任教于普林斯顿大学、麻省理工学院及哈佛大学，现为哈佛大学荣誉Cogan学校教授。其代表作有《理性、真理与历史》、《词与生活》、《重建哲学》等。
目录信息
读后感
A brief and simple introduction to Putnam's pragmatism. Simple for it is originally a series of 4 talks in a seminar, thus it is rid of complicated abstract arguments typical of gurus like Putnam. Putnam tries to portrait a kind of ethnics that is NOT base...
评分A brief and simple introduction to Putnam's pragmatism. Simple for it is originally a series of 4 talks in a seminar, thus it is rid of complicated abstract arguments typical of gurus like Putnam. Putnam tries to portrait a kind of ethnics that is NOT base...
评分原来写的笔记丢了，书也不在身边，现在只好参考Eric Rovie写的书评重新写一遍了。 http://commons.pacificu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1265&context=eip 已经有几部以ethics without blah blah（god，principle等）为题的作品，此书属于典型的文不对题型。书中和伦理学...
评分A brief and simple introduction to Putnam's pragmatism. Simple for it is originally a series of 4 talks in a seminar, thus it is rid of complicated abstract arguments typical of gurus like Putnam. Putnam tries to portrait a kind of ethnics that is NOT base...
评分A brief and simple introduction to Putnam's pragmatism. Simple for it is originally a series of 4 talks in a seminar, thus it is rid of complicated abstract arguments typical of gurus like Putnam. Putnam tries to portrait a kind of ethnics that is NOT base...
用户评价
坦白说，《Ethics without Ontology》这个书名本身就足以引起我的强烈兴趣。我曾花费大量时间研读那些试图为道德寻找形而上学基础的哲学著作，从古希腊的“善的理念”到现代的“自由意志”的论证，无不围绕着“存在”的本质展开。然而，我也深切地体会到，一旦本体论的根基出现松动，整个伦理大厦似乎也随之动摇。许多时候，我们似乎需要先回答“什么才是真正存在的？”，才能进一步讨论“我们应该如何行动？”。但这种顺序，在我看来，也可能是一种不必要的限制。这本书的出现，仿佛为我打开了一扇新的大门，它直接挑战了这种传统的逻辑，提出了“没有本体论的伦理学”的可能性。我迫切希望书中能够清晰地阐述，在不依赖任何关于“终极实在”或“事物本质”的形而上学论证的情况下，我们如何能够有效地构建和维系一套道德体系。这是否意味着，我们将更多地从人类的心理结构、情感需求、社会建构，甚至是进化论的视角来理解道德？我期待书中能够提供令人信服的论据，说明伦理学如何能够在摆脱本体论的束缚后，反而获得更大的解释力和生命力，并且能够有效地处理那些现实世界中棘手的道德难题。
评分这本书的标题，The title of this book, "Ethics without Ontology," immediately sparked my intellectual curiosity. For centuries, Western philosophy has largely operated under the assumption that a robust ethical framework necessitates a well-defined metaphysical understanding of reality. Thinkers from Aristotle, with his teleological view of nature, to Kant, with his categorical imperatives grounded in transcendental idealism, all grappled with the fundamental question of existence in their attempts to establish moral truths. However, I've often found myself wrestling with the perceived fragility of these systems. If our ethical principles are contingent upon a specific, and often debated, metaphysical stance, what happens when that metaphysical foundation is challenged or proven insufficient? This is precisely where the promise of "Ethics without Ontology" lies for me. It suggests a departure from this traditional dependency, hinting at a possibility for ethics to stand on its own ground, perhaps drawing its strength from other sources. I am eager to explore how the author navigates the complexities of value attribution and moral justification in the absence of overarching ontological claims. Will the book delve into the role of sentiment, social convention, or perhaps even evolutionary psychology in shaping our moral intuitions and practices? The prospect of an ethical system that is less beholden to abstract metaphysical debates and more grounded in the lived experience of individuals and societies is profoundly compelling, and I anticipate a rigorous and thought-provoking exploration.
评分这本书的书名《Ethics without Ontology》在我脑海中激起了强烈的求知欲。我一直对哲学中那些宏大而抽象的理论感到着迷，但同时也常常陷入一种困境：当我们将伦理原则建立在某种关于“存在”的特定理解之上时，一旦那个本体论的基石发生动摇，整个道德体系似乎也变得摇摇欲坠。许多哲学流派，无论是追求“实在”的形而上学，还是探索“本质”的形而上学，都试图为人类的道德行为提供一个坚实的终极依据。然而，究竟什么是“存在”？“实在”又意味着什么？这些问题本身就充满了争议，难以达成共识。因此，“Ethics without Ontology”这个书名，在我看来，就是对这种传统哲学思路的一种大胆挑战，它暗示着一种可能性：伦理学或许能够，也应该，独立于本体论的探究而发展。我非常期待书中能够深入探讨，在不预设任何关于“终极实在”或者“本质存在”的理论的情况下，我们如何能够建构一套完整且具有实践指导意义的伦理体系。这是否意味着，我们将更加关注人类的心理体验、情感反应、社会契约，甚至是那些在日常生活中通过实践和反思而形成的行为规范？我迫切想知道，书中将如何论证，伦理学的有效性和普遍性，是否真的依赖于一套关于“存在”的预设，或者说，是否有一种更直接、更贴近人类经验的方式来理解道德。
评分The very premise of "Ethics without Ontology" presents a fascinating intellectual challenge. It directly confronts a long-standing tradition in philosophical thought that has consistently linked ethical inquiry to metaphysical speculation about the nature of being. Many of the most influential ethical theories, from Plato's conception of the Form of the Good to contemporary discussions on consciousness and personhood, have inherently relied on certain ontological assumptions. However, I've often pondered the implications of this reliance. What if our understanding of morality is, to some extent, shackled by our attempts to definitively answer questions about existence that may be ultimately unanswerable or subject to endless debate? This book, by its very title, offers a compelling alternative perspective. It proposes a pathway for ethics that bypasses the need for a comprehensive metaphysical system. I am particularly keen to understand how the author addresses the perennial problem of moral objectivity within this framework. If we are not grounding our ethical principles in some universally acknowledged aspect of reality, how do we then establish principles that possess broad applicability and persuasive force across different individuals and cultural contexts? Does the book explore alternative foundations for morality, perhaps rooted in human empathy, shared social needs, or even the practical consequences of our actions? The prospect of an ethics that is more pragmatic and less susceptible to the vagaries of metaphysical disputes is, to me, a highly attractive intellectual endeavor.
评分作为一个对伦理学研究充满热情的学生，我一直被那些试图为道德寻找普遍性基础的哲学思潮所吸引。从古希腊的德性伦理，到近代义务论和功利主义，每一派都在试图回答“我们应该如何生活”这一永恒的哲学问题。然而，我时常感到，这些理论在追溯道德根源时，往往会触及到一些极为抽象的本体论预设，比如关于灵魂的本质、关于自由意志的实在性，或者关于宇宙秩序的普遍性。一旦这些本体论的基石被动摇，整个伦理体系似乎也随之失去了支撑。这本书的书名“Ethics without Ontology”恰好击中了我的痛点，它预示着一种更加务实、更加关注人类经验本身的伦理学探索。我非常期待书中能够详细阐述，如何在不依赖任何形而上学声明的情况下，构建一种具有说服力的道德框架。这是否意味着，我们应该更加关注人类的心理结构、情感需求，以及社会互动中的习得性规范？我猜想，书中可能会深入探讨那些源于进化心理学、认知科学，甚至是社会学和人类学研究的观点，试图从更贴近人类实际生活的层面来理解道德的起源和运作。这种从“问题”出发，而非从“存在”出发的探究方式，本身就充满了吸引力，它可能为我们提供一种全新的方式来思考道德，一种不被形而上学的迷雾所遮蔽的清晰视野。
评分当我第一次看到《Ethics without Ontology》这本书的书名时，我脑海中立刻浮现出许多哲学史上的经典讨论。长期以来，本体论——即对“存在”的本质和结构的探究——一直被视为伦理学的基础。许多伟大的哲学家，从柏拉图到黑格尔，都试图在他们的形而上学体系中为道德找到一个坚实的根基。然而，我也常常感到，这种对“存在”的过度依赖，有时反而会将我们引入抽象的泥沼，使得伦理学的讨论变得遥不可及，甚至难以应用于我们真实的日常生活。这本书的标题，正是一种直接而有力的挑战，它似乎在宣告：我们或许可以，甚至应该，构建一种不以本体论为前提的伦理学。我非常好奇书中将如何阐述这一观点。它是否会探讨那些源于经验主义、实用主义，甚至是后现代思想的伦理进路？它又将如何处理“价值”的来源问题？在没有一个关于“何为至善”的本体论解释时，我们又如何能够确信某种行为是“好”的，而另一种行为是“坏”的？我期待书中能够提供详实的论证，说明伦理学如何在“无本体论”的土壤中扎根生长，并且能够有效地指导我们的行为，帮助我们做出更明智的道德选择，即便我们对“世界”的终极本质仍有许多疑问。
评分这本书的封面设计相当引人注目，深邃的蓝色背景配以烫金的银色字体，散发着一种沉静而厚重的学术气息。我一直对哲学领域的某些晦涩概念感到好奇，尤其是在涉及“本体论”这一话题时，我的脑海中总是浮现出关于存在、本质、实在等一系列抽象的思考。然而，“Ethics without Ontology”这个书名本身就带有一种挑战性，它似乎在暗示一种不同于传统哲学路径的可能性，一种不依赖于对“存在”本身进行根本性探究，却依然能够构建起一套完整的伦理体系的可能性。这让我不禁联想到，是否真的存在这样一种伦理学，它能够从经验、情感、社会契约，甚至是我们日常生活的实践中，提炼出普遍适用的道德原则，而无需事先对“什么是真实的存在”、“什么是存在的终极意义”等问题给出明确的答案。这种思路在某种程度上，也反映了后现代主义对宏大叙事和普适性真理的质疑，但将其应用到伦理学中，无疑是一个更加具体和充满实际意义的课题。我期待书中能够探讨，如何在缺乏形而上学基石的情况下，依然能够有效地区分对错善恶，如何构建和维系社会秩序，以及个体如何在不确定的世界中找到行动的道德依据。这本书的书名本身，就像一个哲学上的谜语，吸引着我深入其中，去探索那些我可能从未想象过的理论空间。
评分在我看来，这本书的标题本身就构成了一个极具颠覆性的哲学命题。长久以来，哲学史上的许多重要思潮都将本体论视为伦理学的必要前提。无论是柏拉图的“善的理念”还是亚里士多德的“目的因”，它们都试图在对“存在”的理解中找到道德的根基。然而，随着哲学的发展，尤其是二战后对宏大叙事的怀疑以及对特定语境和实践的重视，许多哲学家开始质疑这种根深蒂固的依赖关系。当“Ethics without Ontology”这个书名映入眼帘时，我立刻联想到，这本书或许正在尝试一条全新的道路，一条不以回答“世界是什么”为前提，而是直接从人类的实践经验、情感反应和社会互动中寻找道德原则的道路。我好奇书中将如何处理“普遍性”的问题。毕竟，伦理学之所以重要，很大程度上在于它能够提供一种跨越个体和文化的普遍指导。如果抛弃了本体论的普遍性担保，我们如何在不同的社会和文化背景下，找到共通的道德语言和价值？书中是否会探讨那些源于人类共享的生理结构、情感需求，甚至是共同的社会困境的道德原则？我期待书中能够提供详实的论证，说明伦理学如何在“无本体论”的情况下，依然能够拥有其解释力和指导力，并且能够有效地回应那些关于道德相对主义的诘难。
评分The title, "Ethics without Ontology," immediately struck me as a bold and potentially revolutionary statement within the philosophical landscape. For so long, the pursuit of ethical understanding has been intertwined with the exploration of metaphysical questions: what is real? what is the nature of existence? what is the essence of the human being? These ontological inquiries have often served as the bedrock upon which ethical systems have been built. Yet, I have frequently encountered instances where these metaphysical foundations felt shaky, or where different ontological commitments led to vastly different ethical conclusions, creating a sense of instability. This book, by explicitly divorcing ethics from ontology, suggests a radical reimagining of this relationship. I am deeply interested in how the author proposes to construct a meaningful and coherent ethical framework without recourse to claims about ultimate reality or the fundamental nature of being. Does the book focus on the practicalities of moral decision-making, the role of social agreements, or perhaps the psychological and emotional dimensions of ethical experience? The very idea of an ethics that can thrive independently of metaphysical speculation is, in my view, a significant philosophical undertaking, and I am eager to discover the arguments and insights that support such a bold claim.
评分在翻阅这本书的章节目录时，我首先被几个小标题所吸引。“实践理性的非形而上学辩护”、“情感在道德判断中的基础性作用”、“社会契约的非本体论建构”等等。这些标题无一不指向一个核心问题：我们是否真的需要一套关于“存在”的宏大理论才能理解和实践道德？这让我不禁回想起自己学习哲学史时，康德的先验范畴、亚里士多德的四因说，以及各种关于实在论和反实在论的争论。这些学说无不试图为我们理解世界和我们在其中的位置奠定一个坚实的基础，而本体论正是这一切的基石。然而，正如一些后来的哲学家所指出的，本体论的探究本身就充满了争议和不确定性，如果伦理学必须依赖于此，那么道德的稳定性岂不是岌岌可危？这本书的出现，似乎是对这种依赖性的一种反拨，它提出了一种全新的视角，即伦理学可以独立于本体论而存在，甚至可能因为摆脱了本体论的束缚而获得更大的自由度和解释力。我尤其好奇书中如何处理“价值”的问题，在没有一个普遍的“好”的本体论解释时，我们如何能够宣称某种行为是“值得追求的”或者“应该避免的”？这种尝试，在我看来，不仅具有学术上的重要性，也可能对我们理解和解决现实世界中的道德困境提供新的思路。
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