H. Peyton Young 教授的《个人策略和社会结构》代表了博弈论制度分析的最新和前沿成果。这部书代表了国际上的“institutional analysis”从以科斯（Ronald Coase）和诺思（Douglass North）为代表的“交易费用经济学”向哈耶克（F. A. von Hayek）主义的“习俗、惯例和制度生成与变迁机理的博弈分析”的转变，其理论分析方法充分利用了国际上最新的演化博弈论的理论进展。演化博弈论制度分析发现，与新制度经济学从交易费用的计算和节约的理论视角所得出的社会发展和制度变迁是决定性和确定性的理论信念相反，演化博弈的社会变迁的理论分析证明，由广义的“institutions”概念所包涵人们的习惯、习俗、惯例以及包括法律、宪法和国家形式等制度安排和式样，都是由具有一定理性但只是具备分散和分立知识的个人在不完全信息中博弈的随机历史结果。

http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/young/

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Peyton Young’s research is concerned with learning in games and its application to the diffusion of innovations, the evolution of social norms and institutions, and the design of decentralized systems of communication and control. He is also interested in applications of game theory to finance.

His books include: Strategic Learning and its Limits (Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures, Oxford University Press, 2004); Social Dynamics (MIT Press, 2001, ed. with Steven N. Durlauf); Fair Representation (2nd ed., The Brookings Institution, 2001, with M.L. Balinski); Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions (Princeton University Press, 1998); Equity: In Theory and Practice (Princeton University Press, 1994); Negotiation Analysis (University of Michigan Press, 1991, ed.); Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications (North-Holland, 1985, ed.); Fair Allocation (American Mathematical Society, 1985, ed.).

He is Past President of the Game Theory Society, a Fellow of the British Academy, and a Fellow of the Econometric Society.