具体描述
Financial crises have been pervasive for many years. Their frequency in recent decades has been double that of the Bretton Woods Period (1945-1971) and the Gold Standard Era (1880-1993), comparable only to the period during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, the financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 came as a great surprise to most people. What initially was seen as difficulties in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, rapidly escalated and spilled over first to financial markets and then to the real economy. The crisis changed the financial landscape worldwide and its full costs are yet to be evaluated. One important reason for the global impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was massive illiquidity in combination with an extreme exposure of many financial institutions to liquidity needs and market conditions. As a consequence, many financial instruments could not be traded anymore, investors ran on a variety of financial institutions particularly in wholesale markets, financial institutions and industrial firms started to sell assets at fire sale prices to raise cash, and central banks all over the world injected huge amounts of liquidity into financial systems. But what is liquidity and why is it so important for firms and financial institutions to command enough liquidity? This book brings together classic articles and recent contributions to this important field of research. It is divided into five parts. These are (i) liquidity and interbank markets; (ii) the public provision of liquidity and regulation; (iii) money, liquidity and asset prices; (iv) contagion effects; (v) financial crises and currency crises. The aim is to provide a comprehensive coverage of role of liquidity in financial crises.
作者简介
Franklin Allen is the Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He has been on the faculty since 1980. He is currently Co-Director of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. He is a past President of the American Finance Association.
Elena Carletti is Professor of Economics at the European University Institute and Joint Chair of the Economics Department and Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies.
Jan Pieter Krahnen is Chair of Corporate Finance at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt.
Marcel Tyrell is Professor of Entrepreneurship & Finance at Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen
Contributors:
Tanju Yorulmazer
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Viral Acharya
New York University
Elena Carletti
European University Institute
Professor Douglas Gale
New York University
Sudipto Bhattacharya
London School of Economics
Prof. Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University
Marcel Tyrell
Goethe University
Andrea L. Eisfeldt
Northwestern University
Xavier Freixas
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Cornelia Holthausen
European Central Bank
Bengt Holmstrom
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jean Tirole
Toulouse School of Economics
Gary Gorton
Yale University
Lixin Huang
Georgia State University
Mark J. Flannery
University of Florida
Rafael Repullo
The Center for Monetary and Financial Studies
Jean-Charles Rochet
Toulouse School of Economics
Xavier Vives
IESE Business School, University of Navarra
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
International Monetary Fund
Robert Marquez
Boston University
Doug Diamond
University of Chicago
Raghuram Rajan
University of Chicago
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki
Princeton University
John Moore
The University of Edinburgh
Juan Carlos Cordoba
Rice University
Marla Ripoll
University of Pittsburgh
Guido Lorenzoni
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Amil Dasgupta
London School of Economics
Christian Upper
Deutsche Bundesbank
Andreas Worms
Deutsche Bundesbank
Dr Philipp Hartmann
European Central Bank
Dr. Stefan Straetmans
Maastricht University
Casper G. de Vries
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Itay Goldstein
University of Pennsylvania
Arvind Krishnamurthy
Northwestern University
Ricardo Caballero
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
目录信息
Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, Jan Pieter Krahnen, and Marcel Tyrell
Section 1: Liquidity and Interbank Markets
Chapter 2 Preference Shocks, Liquidity and Central Bank Policy
Sudipto Bhattacharya/Douglas Gale (London School of Economics/New York University)
W. Barnett and K. Singleton, eds., New Approaches to Monetary Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 69-88.
Chapter 3 Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets
Andrea Eisfeldt (Northwestern University)
Journal of Finance, February 2004, 59, pp.1-30
Chapter 4 Financial Intermediaries and Markets
Franklin Allen/Douglas Gale (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania/New York University)
Econometrica, 72(4), July 2004, pp. 1023-106.1
Chapter 5 Financial Fragility, Liquidity and Asset Prices
Franklin Allen/Douglas Gale (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania/New York University)
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(6), December 2004, pp. 1015-1048.
Chapter 6 Interbank Market Integration under Asymmetric Information
Xavier Freixas/Cornelia Holthausen (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona/European Central Bank, Frankfurt)
Review of Financial Studies, 18(2), Summer 2005, pp. 459-90.
Chapter 7 Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight Federal Funds Markets
Craig Furfine (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
Journal of Business, January 2001, 74, 33-57.
Section 2: Public Provision of Liquidity and Regulation
Chapter 8 Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
Bengt Holmstrom/Jean Tirole (MIT/ Universite Sciences Sociales, Toulouse)
Journal of Political Economy, February 1998, 106, pp.1-40.
Chapter 9 Liquidity, Efficiency and Bank Bailouts
Gary Gorton/Lixin Huang (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania/Georgia State University)
American Economic Review, 94(3), June 2004, pp. 455-483.
Chapter 10 Financial Crises, Payments System Problem and Discount Window Lending
Mark Flannery (University of Florida)
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, November 1996, 28(4), pp. 804-824.
Chapter 11 Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort
Rafael Repullo (CEMFI)
International Journal of Central Banking, 1, December 2005, pp. 47-80.
Chapter 12 Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right after all?
Jean-Charles Rochet/Xavier Vives (University Sciences Sociales, Toulouse/IESE, University of Navarra)
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(6), December 2004, pp. 1116-47.
Chapter 13 Competition among Regulators and Credit Market Integration
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia/Robert Marquez (IMF/Arizona State University)
Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), February 2006, pp. 401-30.
Section 3: Money, Liquidity Crises and Asset Prices
Chapter 14 Money in a Theory of Banking
Douglas Diamond/Raghuram Rajan (University of Chicago)
American Economic Review, 96(1), March 2006, pp. 30-53.
Chapter 15 Liquidity and Asset Prices
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki/John Moore (Princeton University/University of Edinburgh)
International Economic Review, 46(2), May 2005, pp. 317-49
Chapter 16 Collateral Constraints in a Monetary Economy
Juan Cordoba/Marla Ripoll (Rice University/University of Pittsburgh)
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(6), December 2004, pp. 1172-1205.
Chapter 17 Inefficient Credit Booms
Guido Lorenzoni (MIT)
Review of Economic Studies, 75(3), July 2008, pp. 809-833.
Section 4: Contagion Effects in Financial Crises
Chapter 18 Financial Contagion through Capital Connections: A Model of the Origin and Spread of Bank Panics
Amil Dasgupta (London School of Economics and Political Science)
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(6), December 2004, pp. 1049-84.
Chapter 19 Information Contagion and Bank Herding
Viral V. Acharya/Tanju Yorulmazer (London Business School/Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February 2008, 40(1), pp. 215-231.
Chapter 20 Cash-in-the-market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures
Viral V. Acharya/Tanju Yorulmazer (London Business School/Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Review of Financial Studies, November 2008, 21, pp. 2705-2742.
Chapter 21 Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion
Franklin Allen/Elena Carletti (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania/ J.W. Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt and CFS)
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008, 53, 89-111.
Chapter 22 Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German Interbank Market: Is there a Danger of Contagion?
Christian Upper/Andreas Worms (Bank for International Settlements/Deutsche Bundesbank)
European Economic Review, 48(4), August 2004, pp. 827-49.
Section 5: Financial Crises and Currency Crises
Chapter 23 Asset Market Linkages in Crisis Periods
Philipp Hartmann/Stefan Straetmans/Casper de Vries (European Central Bank/Maastricht University/Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), February 2004, pp. 313-326.
Chapter 24 Strategic Complementarities and the Twin Crises
Itay Goldstein (University of Pennsylvania)
Economic Journal, 115(503), April 2005, pp. 368-90
Chapter 25 Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual-and-Common-Agency Perspective
Jean Tirole (Universite Sciences Sociales, Toulouse)
American Economic Review, 93(5), December 2003, pp. 1678-1702.
Chapter 26 Exchange Rate Volatility and the Credit Channel in Emerging Markets: A Ricardo Caballero/Arvind Krishnamurthy (MIT/Northwestern University)
International Journal of Central Banking, 1(1), June 2005, pp. 207-45.
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这本书的脚注和参考文献部分，展现了作者惊人的学术广度。这绝不是一本只依赖最新期刊论文堆砌起来的读物。我注意到很多引用可以追溯到十八世纪的经济学手稿，以及一些已经被学术界边缘化的社会心理学研究。这表明作者在构建他的理论框架时，进行了大量的“考古式”挖掘，试图找到现代金融理论的根源性假设。这种对知识传统的尊重和发掘，使得他的论点具有了难以撼动的深度。不过，这也是一把双刃剑：对于那些不熟悉相关背景知识的读者来说，这些详尽的引用可能会让人产生一种“知识壁垒”的压迫感，仿佛作者在用一种只有少数人才能完全理解的语言进行交流。总而言之，这是一本需要投入时间、需要反复咀嚼的书籍，它更像是为那些对金融历史、经济哲学有深厚兴趣的读者准备的，它提供的是视野的拓宽，而非即时的实用技巧。
这本书的语言风格，与其说是严谨的学术写作，不如说是带有强烈个人烙印的深度访谈录。作者的遣词造句充满了古典的韵味，很多术语的运用都带着一种复古的美感，仿佛在刻意抵抗当代金融话语的扁平化趋势。其中有一章专门探讨了“信心”在金融市场中的作用，作者没有使用“市场情绪”或“风险偏好”这类时髦词汇，而是反复使用“契约的脆弱性”和“集体遗忘”来形容这种看不见的力量。这种对语言的精雕细琢，让某些章节读起来有种文学作品的质感，但同时也使得关键信息的提取变得间接。我发现自己不得不频繁地在不同章节之间来回跳跃，以求拼凑出一个完整的论点。对于那些习惯于简洁、高效信息传递的读者来说，这种风格可能会被视为一种负担。然而，对于我这种偏爱在思想的“缝隙”中寻找新知的人来说，这种略带迂回的表达方式，反而提供了一种独特的反思空间，让你在被动接受信息的同时，主动参与到意义的构建过程中去。
这本书的封面设计充满了未来主义的冷峻感，黑白灰的色调，配上那种仿佛数据流动的抽象线条，初看之下，还以为是一本晦涩难懂的学术专著。我是在寻找关于宏观经济学前沿理论的资料时偶然翻到的，最初的预期是它会深入探讨一些复杂的金融工程模型，或者对巴塞尔协议的最新修订进行拉锯式的分析。然而，读完前三章，我意识到我的判断可能失之偏颇了。作者似乎更倾向于从历史的宏大叙事角度切入，用一种近乎散文诗的笔触，描绘了十九世纪末工业革命后期，资本在不同地理区域间快速迁移所引发的结构性摩擦。特别是他对“信息不对称”在早期国际资本流动中扮演的角色进行了极富洞察力的阐述，远超我预期的那种枯燥的定量分析。它没有给我那种直接解决‘当前市场波动’的药方，反而像是一面历史的镜子，让我得以审视那些看似新颖的金融现象背后，其实潜藏着古老的、人性的驱动力。这种叙事方式，虽然在节奏上略显缓慢，但其构建的知识体系的厚重感，是那些速成型的金融手册完全无法比拟的。它更像是在邀请你进行一场长达数百年的智力漫游，而非一次快速的知识补给。
这本书的论证结构，老实说，非常具有挑战性，它不是那种“A导致B，所以C”的线性思维产物。我花了相当长的时间才适应作者的“多中心”论述方式。书中多次穿插了哲学思辨，尤其是在探讨“价值”的本质时，作者似乎有意地将经济学置于伦理学的审视之下。举个例子，在论及固定汇率体系的瓦解时，作者并未直接引用李嘉图的比较优势理论进行推导，而是从当时社会对“稳定”的集体心理需求与实际经济增长速度之间的张力入手，这使得整个分析框架显得非常立体和多维。我特别欣赏作者在处理跨学科问题时的那种游刃有余，他毫不避讳地引用了社会学中的“路径依赖”概念来解释某些金融惯例的顽固性。但这也带来了阅读上的障碍，如果你期待的是教科书式的清晰定义和明确的公式推导，这本书可能会让你感到有些困惑和挫败。它更像是一位经验丰富的老派学者，在你面前展开一幅巨大的、细节繁复的挂毯，需要你耐心去辨认每一根丝线的走向，而不是直接告诉你挂毯的主题是什么。
这个field的纯干货Handbook
这个field的纯干货Handbook
这个field的纯干货Handbook
这个field的纯干货Handbook
这个field的纯干货Handbook
